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THE DAWN OF THE COMPUTER AGE: HOW THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIES TO WARRANT
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF ELECTRONICALLY
STORED INFORMATION
Hon. Robert H. Bohn, Jr.'
and Lynn S. Muster 2
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article
14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights state that no person shall be
subject to an unreasonable search or seizure. To that end, in order for a
search or seizure to be reasonable, it must be issued pursuant to a search
warrant supported by probable cause.4 The search warrant must be issued
by a neutral and detached magistrate, and must describe with particularity
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 5 Ultimately, when a court evaluates the lawfulness of a search and seizure, it
will consider the issuance of the warrant,6 the content of the warrant, the
manner in which the search was executed,8 and the nature of the items
The author is an Associate Justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court. In the
context of a Massachusetts Superior Court case, Judge Bohn authored two extensive memoranda of decision on the topic. The first regarded the defendants' motion to suppress paper
documents and the second regarded the defendants' motion to suppress electronically stored
information.
2 Attorney Muster is a 1994 graduate of the Boston University School of
Law.
While employed as a law clerk in the Massachusetts Superior Court, Attorney Muster was
specially assigned to Judge Bohn. Since September of 2000, she has been employed as a
law clerk in the Massachusetts Appeals Court for Justice Kent B. Smith.
3 The reasonableness of a search and seizure in Massachusetts is governed by the law
of the Commonwealth. The standards that must be applied by the courts in determining the
reasonableness of the conduct, however, must be the same standards as are applied under
federal law. Kent B. Smith, CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 154 (1983). A state is,
however, free to impose greater restrictions on police activity.
4 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 1. A search without a warrant may also be lawful if

(1) it is conducted incident to a valid arrest; (2) it is a search of an automobile when the
police stop the vehicle with probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of
crime; (3) there exists probable cause and exigent circumstances; (4) it is pursuant to the
plain view doctrine; or (5) police have a party's consent. Kent B. Smith, CRIMINAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 170 (1983). These situations are not discussed in this article.
5 § 1.
6 id.

7 §§ 2, 2B.
8 See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927,934 (1995).
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seized. 9 The test is one of reasonableness, and the court will take into account the totality of the circumstances.' 0
Because computers are repositories of personal information, they,
like file cabinets and safe deposit boxes, enjoy strong protection under the
Fourth Amendment and Massachusetts case law." It is, however, sometimes difficult to translate the Fourth Amendment and article 14 guarantees
into the context of computer searches and seizures.12 This article will discuss how the general legal principles of search and seizure have been utilized by different courts to evaluate searches for, and seizures of, electronically stored information. In Part I, we will discuss the nature of the warrant itself, that is, the issues of probable cause and sufficient particularity.
In Part II, the execution of search warrants will be discussed, including the
method of entry into the place to be searched, the time for completion of
the search, the use of civilian experts, the issue of minimal intrusion, and
the seizure of information in plain view. In Part III, we will discuss the
issues of spoliation and the government's obligation to preserve exculpatory evidence.
PART I: THE NATURE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT
Warrants to search for and seize electronically stored information
must meet the same requirements as warrants to search for and seize paper
documents, that is, the warrant must be supported by probable cause and
must be narrowly drawn to include only data pertinent to the investigation.
A.

The Issue of Probable Cause

In Illinois v. Gates, "3 the United States Supreme Court described the
task of an issuing magistrate as "simply to make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit...
including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place.' 4 In Massachusetts, the
9 § 3.
10

See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983); Commonwealth v. Krisco Corp.,

653 N.E.2d 579, 582, 421 Mass. 37, 41-42 (1998).

1 Rafael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV.

J.L. & TECH. 75, 81 (1994). It has been said that utilizing analogies to closed containers or
file cabinets may lead courts to "oversimplify a complex area of Fourth Amendment doctrines and ignore the realities of massive modem computer storage." Id. at 110 (quoting
United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999)).
12 See generally Susan W. Brenner & Barbara A. Frederiksen, Computer Searches
and Seizures: Some Unresolved Issues, 8 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 39 (2001).

" 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
14 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.

20031

WARRANTS AND ELECTRONIC INFORMATION

general rule is similar: an affidavit in support of a warrant authorizing a
search must contain probable cause to believe "that the items sought are
related to the criminal activity under investigation, and that the items reasonably may be expected to be located in the place to be searched at the
time the search warrant issues.' 15 More specifically, the affidavit must
provide a nexus between (1) the criminal activity under
investigation; (2)
16
the items to be seized; and (3) the place to be searched.
The issue of probable cause to search for electronically stored information arises both with respect to the seizure of the computer itself as
well as to the search and seizure of the information stored in its system.
The issues must be considered separately. 17 In other words, in the context
of computer searches, an individual has an expectation of privacy with
respect to the actual computer, as well as a separate expectation of privacy
with respect to the contents of the computer memory stored in the various
warehouses of computer information.' 8 This is because the computer system may have a variety of roles in computer-related crime and, while there
may be probable cause to seize the computer for one role, there may not be
probable cause to search its contents.' 9
The Massachusetts Superior Court case of Commonwealth v. Jackson provides a useful example of how traditional principles of search and
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 693 N.E.2d 158, 166, 427 Mass. 336, 342 (1998); see
United States v. Brunette, 256 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 2001); Commonwealth v. Donohue, 723
N.E.2d 25, 28,430 Mass. 710, 711-12 (2000).
16 Commonwealth v. Jean-Charles, 500 N.E.2d 1332, 1335, 398 Mass. 752,
757
(1986) (citing Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 409 N.E.2d 719, 726, 381 Mass. 319, 328 (1980));
see also Commonwealth v. Alcantara, 760 N.E.2d 1236, 1239, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 591, 59394 (2002).
17 Winick, supra note 11, at 111.
18Id.; see, e.g., Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 535 (N.D. Cal. 1993); United States v. Bias, No. 90-CR162, 1990 WL 265179 (E.D. Wis. 1990). Even if police must seize a computer to avert its
destruction, police will usually be required to obtain a second search warrant to examine its
contents.
19 "Computer-related crime is defined as 'any criminal activity that involves use of
computer technology, directly or indirectly, as the instrumentality or object of the commis15

sion of a criminal act."' Franklin Clark & Kenneth Diliberto, INVESTIGATING COMPUTER

CRIME IX (1996). For example, if the computer is stolen, the computer may be a fruit of the
crime of larceny. In contrast, the system itself may be a tool of the offense if it is used to
counterfeit United States currency. See Federal Guidelines for Searching and Seizing
Computers, 56 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2023, 2026 (Dec. 21, 1994). The guidelines have not
been officially adopted by any agency and are meant only as assistance, not authority.
There have been 1997 and 1999 supplements as well as 2001 revisions. The computer
system could also simply be incidental to the offense, that is, a repository of evidence, such
as when a drug dealer stores records pertaining to customers, prices, and quantities delivered. Id. Computers are rarely instrumentalities. A computer is only an instrumentality of
a crime if it is used, for example, to break into another computer. Kenneth S. Rosenblatt,
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY CRIME 430 (1995).

20 Because issues of appellate review may not have been fully resolved by the time
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seizure were applied to electronically stored information. In Jackson, four
search warrants authorized the seizure of certain computer hardware, software, and peripherals from the Jackson & Jackson law offices. The warrants also authorized a search of the seized computer system for data concerning target individuals and other documentary evidence, e.g., bookkeeping records and bank account information. After a careful reading of the
Commonwealth's affidavits in support of the warrant, the issuing judge
found there was probable cause to believe that the items to be seized contained evidence of insurance fraud by the attorneys and clients of the law
firm. That, however, was not the end of the inquiry. Given the nature of
the case before her, she also had to resolve issues of privilege and issues of
particularity.
B.

Probable Cause and the Issue of Privilege

Beyond the requirements of probable cause, both federal and state
law recognize and protect certain communications between attorney and
client as well as between others in protected relationships. These privileges, while not absolute, are often strictly construed and narrowly applied.2 1 The privileges
are not constitutionally based,22 but are "creature[s]
2'' 3
policy.
of public
In Massachusetts, the public policy concerning privileges is set
forth in MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 1. Pursuant to that statute, a search
warrant for privileged information will not issue unless there is probable
cause to believe that the evidence sought will be destroyed, secreted, or
lost should a warrant not be issued. Furthermore, when privileged communications involve the commission of a crime, any privilege "vanishes"
in the face of a "crime-fraud" exception. The crime-fraud exception means
that if there is probable cause to believe that, for example, the services of a
lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid another to commit or plan
to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a
crime or fraud, the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege
has been established. 24 In such cases, section 1 offers no privilege protection. 25
this article goes to print, we use a pseudonym for this case.
21 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 393 N.E.2d 658, 661, 377 Mass. 772, 775
(1979).
22

See Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1205, 390 Mass. 357,

358 (1983).
23 See Commonwealth v. Paszko, 461 N.E.2d 222, 236-37, 391 Mass. 164, 187-88
(1984).
24

See Purcell v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 676 N.E.2d 436, 439, 424

Mass. 109, 112-13 (1997).
25 Id.; see In Re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 812 n.74 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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In the Jackson case, for example, the items to be seized pursuant to
the warrants included files of clients believed to be involved in the various
fraudulent schemes, financial records showing the flow of money to various medical providers who were part of the schemes, medical records
maintained by those involved in the fraud, and other related documents.
The issuing judge determined that the Commonwealth had established the
necessary probable cause to believe that the attorneys in possession of the
particular evidence had committed, were committing, or were about to
commit a crime. This determination removed the desired evidence from
the statutory preference for discovery by subpoena, and into the arena of
the crime-fraud exception. 26
In sum, the Fourth Amendment and article 14 require a search warrant to be supported by probable cause for the seizure of paper documents
and electronically stored information. Even so, certain communications
may be privileged; and, warrants seeking such communications need to be
supported by affidavits establishing additional requirements.
C.

The Issue of Sufficient Particularity

In addition to probable cause, a search warrant must "particularly
describe" the premises to be searched and the things to be seized under
article 14 and MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, §§ 1, 2. Generally, the particularity requirement is to be applied with a practical measure of flexibility
and only requires reasonable specificity.27 How detailed the warrant must
be follows directly from the nature of the items that there is probable cause
to seize; detail is necessary only to the extent the issuing magistrate must
limit the search and seizure to those items.28
The particularity requirement was enunciated in Marron v. United
States,29 and is meant to limit the discretion of the officer executing the
search warrant. 3 The requirement ensures that a "search will be carefully
26

In Jackson, the issuing judge tried to protect the attorney-client privilege as fol-

lows: after printing out a document that the searching expert believed to be within the scope
of the warrant, he, without reading the document further, placed it in a manila envelope,
sealed the envelope with evidence tape, and stored it for eventual delivery to a special master. The judge who issued the warrants appointed that special master to determine whether
the documents were protected by attorney-client privilege. The judge subsequently ruled on
the applicability of the crime-fraud exception to those documents.
2 See Commonwealth v. Corradino, 332 N.E.2d 907, 911, 368 Mass. 411,416 (1975)
("it seems good policy to allow a certain leeway or leniency in the after-the-fact review of
the sufficiency of applications for warrants"); see also Commonwealth v. McRae, 581
N.E.2d 502, 502-03, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 559, 559 (1991) (warrants and affidavits must not
be subjected to "hypertechnical scrutiny").
21 See Commonwealth v. Freiberg, 540 N.E.2d 1289, 1300, 405 Mass. 282, 298, cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 940 (1989).
29 275 U.S. 192 (1927)
30 See Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 409 N.E.2d 719, 725, 381 Mass. 319, 327 (1980)
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tailored to its justification, and will not take on the character of the wideranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit."', The requirement also informs the person subject to the search and seizure what
the officers are entitled to take.32 So long as the warrant does not authorize
general rummaging, the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement does
not require a warrant to specify the criminal offense to which the objects of
the search are related.33
In cases "involving complex financial transactions and widespread
allegations of various types of fraud, reading the warrant with practical
flexibility entails34 an awareness of the difficulty of piecing together the
'paper puzzle."'
The rationale behind this flexible reading of the particularity requirement is that, in investigations of ongoing fraudulent practices,
that is, those business enterprises "permeated with fraud," all of the records
are likely to be relevant to show the existence of a fraudulent scheme. 35 It
(citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971)); see also United States v.
Albert, 195 F. Supp. 2d 267, 273 (D. Mass. 2002) (particularity requirement prevents
"wholesale rummaging" in search of contraband); Commonwealth v. Balicki, 762 N.E.2d
290, 297, 436 Mass. 1, 7 (2002) (particularity requirement protects against "exploratory
rummaging" by police); Freiberg,540 N.E.2d at 1300, 405 Mass. at 298 (same).
31 Commonwealth v. Carrasco, 540 N.E.2d 173, 177, 405 Mass. 316, 323 (1989)
(quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)).
32 United States v. Scott, 83 F. Supp. 2d 187, 198 (D. Mass. 2000).
33 See In re Application of Lafayette Academy, 610 F.2d 1, 3-7 (1st Cir. 1979); Albert, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 276.
34 United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing United
States v. Vertresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)).
3-' Commonwealth v. Kenneally, 418 N.E.2d 1224, 1226, 383 Mass. 269, 271, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 849 (1981) (seizure of all "records and papers" of insurance company
upheld because company operating without license, making "everything it did unlawful");
see United States v. Falon, 959 F.2d 1143, 1146-48 (1st Cir. 1992).
Nearly every circuit has adopted the "permeated with fraud" doctrine, i.e., a doctrine that permits wholesale seizure of all records of a business enterprise if there is probable cause to believe the enterprise is participating in widespread fraud. See, e.g., United
States v. Humphrey, 104 F.3d 65, 69 (5th Cir. 1997) (warrant for "all records" search of
private residence valid in light of pervasive nature of fraud, overlap of business and personal lives, and limitation to financial transaction); United States v. Oloyede, 982 F.2d 133,
141 (4th Cir. 1992) (all files of law firm permissibly seized where warrant established that
firm was permeated by fraud); United States v. Bentley, 825 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 901 (1987) (when whole business is a fraud, warrant properly may
permit seizure of everything agents find because every transaction is potential evidence of
fraud); United States v. Kail, 804 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 1986) (warrant to seize almost all
business records justified because there was probable cause to believe fraud permeated
entire business operation); United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508 (11 th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1069 (1987) (search warrant sufficiently particular because business
permeated with fraud and fraud affected all customers); United States v. Offices Known as
50 State Distributing Co., 708 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th Cir. 1983) ("general" warrant justified
because there was probable cause to believe fraud permeated entire business operation and
impossible to segregate those business records that would be evidence of fraud from those
that would not); Nat'l City Trading Co. v. United States, 635 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2nd Cir.
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may also be proper to seize all of the documents of a business enterprise
because "proof of similar acts is admissible to show intent or the absence
of mistake. 36
Normally, a search warrant for information will extend to papers
and electronically stored information, especially in light of the reality of
the changing world that "more and more business records and narcotics
ledgers are being kept on computer., 37 Although computers may be
seized, the search is technically for evidence that is expected to be found at
particular premises, including evidence that may be in the form of documents or may be in the form of data stored on the computer or on floppy
disks.38 As a result, if the warrant is particular enough with respect to the
objects to be seized and establishes probable cause that certain records will
contain evidence of a crime, the searching agents may seize such records,
whether they are kept in paper format or within a computer.
PART II: THE EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT
When warrants authorize the search for, and seizure of, electronically stored information, the execution of the search is also subject to
Fourth Amendment principles of reasonableness. More specifically, courts
will review the method of entry into the location, the time within which the
search was completed, who actually executed the search, exactly how the
search was conducted, and what documents or information were seized.4 °
A.

Method of Entry

The Fourth Amendment requires that police officers knock and announce their presence before entering to execute a search warrant. 41 The
1980) (probable cause to believe business permeated with fraud justified seizure of all business records as described in warrant); United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 309 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980) (seizure of all business records of commodities firm suspected of fraudulent scheme permissible).
While Massachusetts has not specifically adopted the permeated by fraud doctrine,
it has embraced the underlying concept that, where a business is thoroughly infused with
fraud, a warrant authorizing seizure of all record of the business is not overbroad. See Kenneally, 418 N.E.2d at 1226, 383 Mass. at 271.
36 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 483 (1976); see United States v. Hershenow,
680 F.2d 847, 851 (1st Cir. 1982).
37 Rosenblatt, supranote 19, at 226.
38 Id.
at

312-13.

39 See, e.g., United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571 (1st Cir. 1990); In the Matter of
the Enforcement of a Subpoena, 767 N.E.2d 566, 575, 436 Mass. 784, 793-94 (2002).
40 See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995); Dalia v. United States, 441
U.S. 238, 258 (1979).
41 Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1997).
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policies underlying the knock and announce rule are intended to decrease
the potential for violence, protect privacy, and prevent unnecessary damage to property.4 2 Courts have upheld forceful entries to execute warrants
which would otherwise have required knock and announce procedures
when the entry by force occurred after the officers knocked, announced,
and received no answer.43 Courts have also upheld forcible entries if some
exigency creates a need to dispense with the knock and announce require44
ment, so long as law enforcement personnel do not "create" the exigency.
Exigency exists when there is a reasonable basis to conclude that, if police
officers conform to the knock and announce rule, evidence will be destroyed or removed.45 Whenever police have sufficient information at the
time of the application for a warrant to justify such a requirement, the decision whether to dispense with the requirement of announcement is left to a
judicial officer.46
In the execution of warrants for electronically stored information,
the same calculation must be done. If the computer equipment that the
police are attempting to seize and/or search contains a device that could
effect the irreversible erasure of computer information, an exigency may
exist that abrogates the knock and announce requirements.47 Oftentimes,
these devices can even be accessed via an outside telephone line. It has
been noted by many authorities that those searching computers must immediately secure the area around the computers and, even then, there remains the potential for remote or rapid destruction of evidence.48
In the Jackson case mentioned above, the search warrant required
the police to knock and announce their presence. The state troopers executing the search did indeed knock and, for a reasonable time, attempted to
announce their presence. After receiving no response for almost fifteen
minutes, the Massachusetts state trooper in charge of the search, concerned
about the possible destruction of electronically stored evidence, broke the
glass to the front door of the law office and entered the building. The
42

Commonwealth v. Cundriff, 415 N.E.2d 172, 177, 382 Mass. 137, 146 (1980), cert.

denied, 451 U.S. 973 (1981).
43 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Watson, 629 N.E.2d 1341, 1345, 36 Mass. App. Ct.
252, 258 (1994).
44 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 91 F.3d 96, 98 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Mendonsa, 989 F.2d 366, 370-71 (9th Cir. 1993); Niro v. United States, 388 F.2d 535, 53940 (1st Cir. 1968); Commonwealth v. Forde, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720-21, 367 Mass. 798, 802
(1975).
45 Commonwealth v. Macias, 711 N.E.2d 130, 132-33, 429 Mass. 698, 701 (1999).
46 Commonwealth v. Gomes, 556 N.E.2d 100, 102, 408 Mass. 43, 45 (1990);
Commonwealth v. Scalise, 439 N.E.2d 818, 823, 387 Mass. 413, 420 (1982).
47 See, e.g., Mahlberg v. Mentzer, 968 F.2d 772, 775-76 (8th Cir. 1992).
48 See, e.g., Clark & Diliberto, supra note 19, at 54; David Icove, Karl Seger, & Wil-

liam VonStorch,

COMPUTER CRIME,

A CRIMEFIGHTER'S

HANDBOOK

383-84 (1995); Rosen-

blatt, supra note 19, at 223, 228, 244-49; Federal Guidelinesfor Searching and Seizing
Computers, supranote 19, at 2040.
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trooper in charge then immediately instructed the searching officers to locate each computer and disconnect the modems. These steps were intended to block any outside access to the computer system and thus prevent
the destruction of evidence.
B.

Time for Completion of the Search
1.

Completion Within Seven Days

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 3A, states that "[elvery officer to
whom a warrant to search is issued shall return the same to the court by
which it was issued as soon as it has been served and in any event no later
than seven days from the issuance thereof." 49
The purpose of the statutory time limit for the execution of a warrant was discussed extensively in Commonwealth v. Cromer,5 ° where the
Supreme Judicial Court stated that "[a] search warrant may issue only
when facts are presented to a magistrate which show probable cause that
relevant evidence will be found at a designated location. The longer police
wait before executing the warrant, however, the more likely it is that the
situation will change so that the facts that supported the magistrate's determination of probable cause will no longer exist." 51 The Supreme Judicial Court went on to hold: "because a warrant cannot be executed after it
has been returned to court, and because § 3A requires return of a search
warrant within seven days, we think that it is logical to infer from § 3A a
legislative judgment that warrants must be executed, as well as returned,
within seven days. '52 This statement, however, was made before the advent of the computer age and before the Supreme Judicial Court could envision a scenario where execution of a search could continue after the return of the warrant had been filed. Currently, in cases in which the warrant
directs agents to seize broad categories of records, or even all records,
courts have upheld the "carting off' of whole file cabinets containing
pounds of unsorted paper, to be searched off-site, after the return of the
warrant.53

The rationale that searches can be executed off-site because of the
volume of information has been extended, in some circuits, to include
49 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, §3A (emphasis added).
50 313 N.E.2d 557, 365 Mass. 519 (1974).

51 Cromer, 313 N.E.2d at 560-61, 365 Mass. at 524.
52 Id. (emphasis added).
53 See, e.g., United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358, 1363-64 (10th Cir. 1997); United
States Postal Serv. v. C.E.C. Servs., 869 F.2d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v.
Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609,
614 (11th Cir. 1985).
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computers. 54 The developing case law proposes that, because off-site
computer searches are reasonable, it may be necessary, by implication, for
the return of the warrant to be filed with the court before such off-site
searching can be completed. 55 Searches for electronically stored information in Massachusetts, therefore, are probably not subject to the statutory
requirement that the search be completed within seven days. They may,
however, be subject to some test of reasonableness.
2.

Completion Within a Reasonable Time

Notwithstanding statutes such as section 3A, a survey of the authorities evidences a directive to complete computer searches within a reasonable time.56 Although courts have not addressed the specific time
frame that is constitutionally reasonable, it likely depends upon several
factors, including the size of the computer memory; the complexity of the
computer's organizational structure, encryption, and password issues; the
type of search engine available; the type of documents being sought; and
the resources available to the searching party.57 For example, in "Opera54 See, e.g., United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 527
U.S. 1011 (1999) ("it is no easy task to search a well-laden hard drive by going through all
of the information it contains, let alone to search through it and the disks for information
that may have been 'deleted"'); United States v. Sissler, No. 1:90-CR-12, 1991 WL 239000,
at *4 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 30, 1991) (police permitted to remove computers from defendant's
residence to continue search off-site and to allow computer expert "to 'crack' [passwords
and other security devices], a process that takes some time and effort"), aff d, 966 F.2d
1455 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993); United States v. Hunter, 13 F.
Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998) ("[o]ften it is simply impractical to search a computer at
the search site because of the time and expertise required to unlock all sources of information"); United States v. Gawrysiak, 972 F. Supp. 853, 866 (D.N.J. 1997) ("[a] reasonable
search of computer files may include copying those files on to a disk on the scene, for later
time-consuming review of the index of documents to cull the relevant time periods and
subject matters while returning the remainder"); United States v. Yung, 786 F. Supp. 1561,
1569 (D. Kan. 1992) (computer files "clearly could not be individually reviewed prior to
completion of the search").
55 That said, the seizure and removal of a defendant's entire computer system is not
the preferred method of searching a computer's memory. "[C]opying [the computer data
onto a disk at the scene] is less intrusive than seizing because copying does not deprive a
defendant of the use of his property." United States v. Simons, 29 F. Supp. 2d 324, 329
(E.D. Va. 1998). However, where a computer contains a large number of documents that
must be reviewed to determine whether they are amenable to seizure, removal of the computer from the site of the search and conducting the search of the computer memory off-site
is appropriate and even encouraged. See generally Federal Guidelinesfor Searching and
Seizing Computers, supra note 19, at 2038-40. It is unclear as to what number of documents on the computer will define whether on-site or off-site is appropriate.
56 See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60 (1967); Cromer, 313
N.E.2d at
560-61, 365 Mass. at 524.
57 See generallyFederalGuidelinesfor Searchingand Seizing Computers, supra note
19, at 2038-40; see also Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d 1184, 1189, 424 Mass.

2003]

WARRANTS AND ELECTRONIC INFORMATION

tion Sun Devil," the Secret Service's 1990 assault on "crackers, 5 8 agents
seized more than forty computers and 23,000 floppy discs, and spent more
than one year on an analysis of what was seized.59
The test of whether the time within which a search warrant was
executed is reasonable may also depend on whether there continued to be
6
probable cause for the search, or whether probable cause had dissipated. 0
A delay in executing a warrant can still be reasonable unless, at the time of
execution, probable cause no longer existed and the defendant can demonstrate that he suffered some legal prejudice attributable to the delay, such
as when evidence is found on the premises that would not have been present had a prompt search taken place.6' If the search warrant specifically
requires the search of the computer and its related equipment to be completed within a specific time frame, the search must be so completed, or the
warrant may be void.62 Normally, however, once a computer or its related
equipment is seized, the evidence is frozen in time and, for that reason,
probable cause continues to exist and allows continual search and review
of the stored information.
Because computers and related equipment may be seized and retained for a reasonable, sometimes extended, period of time in which to
conduct a search, issues may arise with respect to businesses that require
that equipment in order to continue its operations. One way to alleviate
that problem is for government agents to copy the computer storage media
for the business entity, while the government retains the originals as part of
the investigation.63
In Jackson, to minimize the disruptive effect of the search, the warrant required that, prior to the commencement of the off-site search of the
seized computer components, and "as soon as reasonably practicable," the
Commonwealth was required to prepare a back-up copy of the entire system's information. This back-up copy was to be sufficient to allow the
return of all the information contained in computerized form to the law
firm in a useable format. In addition, the warrant required the Common802, 809 (1997) (search of computerized files is "extraordinary circumstance[]" where
specialized knowledge is required to conduct the search).
58 "Crackers" are persons who break into computer systems
illegally.
59 Rosenblatt, supra note 19, at 226.
60 See Commonwealth v. Malone, 506 N.E.2d 163, 165, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 70, 73
(1987).
61 Cromer, 313 N.E.2d at 561, 365 Mass. at 525-26.
62 See Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932); see also United States v.
Brunette, 76 F. Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D. Me. 1999), aff d, 256 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001) (where
government failed to complete search of computers within sixty days, as prescribed by
warrant, evidence suppressed because government offered no legitimate reason for delay).
63 Winick, supra note 11, at 114; see, e.g., In re Southwestern Equip. Co. Search
Warrant, 746 F. Supp. 1563, 1581 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
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wealth to make a mirror image of all the data and files on the computer
systems, using the system's own peripherals. Again, that mirror image was
to be sufficient to capture all the actual data on the file server's hard drive,
as well as data purged or deleted from the system to the extent possible,
and was to identify all users who had access to particular data on the system. Such procedures allowed the law firm to continue its business while
the search of the computers was proceeding.
C.

Use of Civilian Experts

In Commonwealth v. Sbordone,64 the Supreme Judicial Court addressed the question whether, and to what extent, a civilian may participate
in a search conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant. 65 Indeed, federal
agents are expressly authorized by statute to utilize civilian assistance.66 In
Massachusetts, however, neither article 14 nor MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276,
§ 2, expressly permits nor prohibits civilian assistance in executing search
warrants. "Active civilian participation in conducting a search, absent
adequate justification and police supervision, greatly increases the potential for an unreasonable intrusion of privacy because civilians are not
sworn to uphold the law, and they are not specially trained to conduct
' 67
searches lawfully and in accordance with the provisions of the warrant.
But the Supreme Judicial Court also recognized that "a civilian may possess a peculiar expertise or knowledge regarding the means of retrieval or
identification of items covered by a warrant, and a rule permitting civilian
assistance in such circumstances actually enhances the reasonableness of
the search by lessening its intrusiveness." 68 This is particularly true in a
search through computerized files "where it is necessary for a civilian with
specialized knowledge actually to conduct the search.,, 69 The civilians,
however, must be adequately supervised by police to ensure the warrant is
properly executed and its scope not exceeded. Again, the required level of
supervision depends on the circumstances.7 °
In Jackson, the judge who issued the search warrant appointed a civilian who was a computer expert and fraud investigator employed by the
64 424 Mass. 802, 806 (1997).
65

Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d 1184, 1188,424 Mass. 802, 806 (1997).

66 See 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994); see also United States v. Robertson, 21 F.3d 1030,

1032-34 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Clouston, 623 F.2d 485, 486 (6th Cir. 1980).
67 Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d at 1190, 424 Mass. at 810-11.
68 Id. at 1188, 424 Mass. at 807.
69 Id. at 1189, 424 Mass. at 809; see, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 692 F. Supp.
119, 126-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (upholding search executed by civilian computer expert).
70 Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d at 1189, 424 Mass. at 809. The Supreme Judicial Court also
noted that it is good practice to "have the warrant itself indicate that permission has been
obtained for a named civilian to be present at the search to assist the police." Id. at 1188
n.9, 424 Mass. at 806 n.9.
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Board of Bar Overseers to facilitate the search for electronically stored
information on the Jackson & Jackson computer system. This civilian expert also assisted in the preparation of the warrants which specifically referenced him, as well as "such other computer experts and specialists as are
reasonable necessary." The expert, though civilian, was held to the same
standard as if the searching agent had been a police officer.
D. Minimal Intrusion
In a traditional search for business records and documents, a review
of the content of the papers must necessarily be allowed in order to determine whether the document falls within the parameters of the warrant.
That review, however, must nevertheless
be somewhat constrained. As the
71
court stated in United States v.Hunter:
Records searches are vexing in their scope, because invariably some irrelevant records will be scanned in locating the
desired documents. Such searches spark protests over the
amount of discretion given to the searching officers, and
these concerns are heightened when the documents include
potentially privileged legal materials. A warrant calling for a
thorough records search does not necessarily give officers
too much discretion, however. Although care must be taken
to "minimize[] unwarranted intrusions upon privacy," records searches "permit[] officers to examine many papers,"
in recognition of "the reality that few people keep documents
of their 72criminal transactions in a folder marked 'crime records.'
In paper searches, "some perusal, generally fairly brief, [is] necessary in order for the police to perceive the relevance of the documents to
the crime ... ;,,73but, "the perusal must cease at the point of which the
warrant's inapplicability to each document is clear., 74 "In searches for
papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, at
least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those
papers authorized to be seized ... responsible officials, including judicial
officials, must take care to assure that [the searches] are conducted
in a
75
manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy."

71 13 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Vt. 1998).
72 United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 582 (D. Vt. 1998).
73 United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1258 (2d Cir. 1979).
74 United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
75 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n. II(1976).
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Since electronic storage is likely to contain a great quantity and variety of information, computers make "tempting targets" in searches for
incriminating information.76 This very quantity and variety of information
increases the likelihood that information irrelevant to the lawful investigation will also be perused." Relevant files can often be sifted only from
irrelevant files by examining the stored computer data.7 8 Nevertheless,
"computer records searches are no less constitutional than searches of
physical records,79where innocuous documents may be scanned to ascertain
their relevancy."
Before a wide-ranging exploratory search is conducted, the issuing
magistrate may require agents to provide an outline of the methods they
will use to sort the electronically stored information. 80 For example, the
issuing magistrate may require the warrant and/or affidavit to incorporate
particular keyword searches,81 or temporal delineations.8 2
Once police or other agents have seized large quantities of computer
memory, they have at least three methods of distinguishing relevant information from irrelevant information.83 Officers can either skim portions of
every file stored in the memory, print out a directory of the title and file
type for each file in the memory, or conduct a keyword search of the data
stored. 84 The problem with reviewing each file in the memory is that evidence may be located in unusual places on the hard disk and may result in
missed evidence. 85 Furthermore, a typical desktop computer may contain
thousands of files, which are stored in a hierarchy within hundreds of
nested directories. 86 The problem with printing a directory of the title and
file type is that "not everyone is obliging enough to have a file labeled 'coWinick, supra note 11, at 105.
id.
id.
United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 584 (D. Vt. 1998).
80 Winick, supra note 1I, at 108.
81 See Commonwealth v. Greineder, No. 108588 (Norf. Super. 2001).
82 See United States v. Bucuvalas, 970 F.2d 937, 942 n.7 (1st Cir. 1992); In re Lafayette Acad., 610 F.2d 1, 4 n.4 (lst Cir. 1979).
83 Winick, supra note 11, at 107.
84 Id. In keyword searches, the searching officer uses a software program to identify
files that might be relevant to inspect, but the searching officer does not inspect the contents
of the file to determine that relevancy. Brennan & Frederiksen, supra note 12, at 95. For
example, in Jackson, the computer expert ran a keyword search using a software program
called DiskSearch II. The program produced output of all computer files that contained a
particular keyword. The output is commonly called "hits." The program also details one
line of text to provide context for the hits. When using DiskSearch II, it was not necessary
to open or view the file to determine whether the keyword was contained therein; however,
it was still necessary to view the file to determine whether the hit was within the categories
of documents permitted to be seized.
76
77
78
79

85 Winick, supra note 11, at 107.

86 Brennan & Frederiksen, supra note 12, at 95.
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cain.sls' in their WordPerfect directory. 87 As such, keyword searches are
often the most efficient types of searches. But unless the computer analyst
knows how the data was organized and stored, there will necessarily be
trial and error to determine key phrases, words, and places.8 8
If the searching expert had been limited to a strict keyword search
in Jackson, that search would have been both under-inclusive and overinclusive. More specifically, a keyword search using a suspected client's
name would have identified files in which a client's name appeared but
which did not relate to the client.89 A keyword search also may not have
adequately identified documents concerning certain joint ventures if the
Commonwealth could not determine what keywords would identify those
files. Thus, the Commonwealth was not required to use a strict keyword
search in executing the warrant for electronically stored information. 9°
E.

Plain View

In the course of conducting a cursory review of information stored
on a computer or its related equipment, the searching officer may inadvertently view other potentially incriminating documents. Police are not obligated to disregard files listed in plain view whose titles suggest contents
that evidence criminal activity. 91
"Under [the plain view] doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position
from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant. 9 2 Such evidence, termed "mere
evidence" as distinguished from contraband, fruits, and instrumentalities of
a crime which may be seized because their nexus to criminal activity is
obvious, may only be seized "if the officers recognize it as plausibly re87

Rosenblatt, supra note 19, at 225; cf. Commonwealth v. Hinds, 768 N.E.2d 1067,

1072-73, 437 Mass. 54, 61-62 (2002) (computer expert permitted to open "2BOYS.JPG"
file because he recognized it as title for child pornography).
88 See generally FederalGuidelinesfor Searching and Seizing Computers, supra note
19, at 2037.
89 For example, if the suspected client referred another client to the law firm and
his/her name was listed in the referred client's file.
90 Compare United States v. Abell, 914 F. Supp. 519, 521 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (ordering
a specified method to be used in searching computer files seized from law office), with
Commonwealth v. Greineder, No. 108588 (Norf. Super. 2001).
91 Commonwealth v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 588 N.E.2d 643, 647, 412 Mass. 224, 228
(1992); Hinds, 768 N.E.2d at 1073, 437 Mass. at 61.
92 Commonwealth v. D'Amour, 704 N.E.2d 1166, 1172, 428 Mass. 725, 730-31
(1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Santana, 649 N.E.2d 717, 721, 420 Mass. 205, 211
(1995)); see Hinds, 768 N.E.2d at 1073, 437 Mass. at 61 (officer lawfully opened computer
file because he recognized it as title for child pornography, not because he thought it contained electronic mail, the subject of the search); see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S.
128 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
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lated to criminal activity of which they already were aware." 93 The dis-

covery of the seized evidence must have been inadvertent and unexpected
from the perspective of the searching officers.94 In Jackson, the Massachusetts state troopers conducting the search seized a number of documents
that implicated various employees of the Jackson & Jackson law firm in a
usurious loan company. The defendants' motion to suppress these particular documents was allowed because there had been no prior knowledge of
the loan company or its usurious relationship with Jackson & Jackson clients. More specifically, there was simply nothing in the warrant or its supporting affidavit to indicate that the troopers could have recognized the
documents as95plausibly related to criminal activity "of which they already
were aware."
PART III: PRESERVATION OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
The Commonwealth is obligated to preserve exculpatory evidence.
Such obligation grows out of its duty to disclose "evidence favorable to an
accused" upon request, where the evidence is material either to guilt or
punishment.9 6 Furthermore, prosecutors are required "to do their utmost to
preserve and present 'exculpatory evidence which is available to the prosecution."' 97 If a defendant claims that the Commonwealth has lost, destroyed, or otherwise failed to preserve evidence in its possession, custody,
or control, the defendant must establish a "'reasonable possibility, based on
concrete evidence rather than a fertile imagination,' that access to the [evidence] would have produced evidence favorable to [her] cause. 9 8 If the
defendant meets this burden, the court will then weigh the culpability of
the Commonwealth, the materiality of the evidence, and the potential
prejudice to the defendant. 99
If the evidence no longer exists, and the defendant had made a request for it, the defendant need only show a reasonable possibility that the
evidence was exculpatory.1°° Put another way, the defendant is entitled to
93 D'Amour, 704 N.E.2d at 1172, 428 Mass. at 730-31; see Commonwealth v. LaP-

lante, 622 N.E.2d 1357, 1361, 416 Mass. 433, 440 (1993); Commonwealth v. Balicki, 762
N.E.2d 290, 436 Mass. 1, 8 (2002).
94 D'Amour, 704 N.E.2d at 1172, 428 Mass. at 731; see Balicki, 762 N.E.2d at 297,
436 Mass. at 8.
9' LaPlante,622 N.E.2d at 1361,416 Mass. at 440.
96 Commonwealth v. Sasville, 616 N.E.2d 476, 479, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 15, 19 (1993).
97 Commonwealth v. Charles, 489 N.E.2d 679, 687, 397 Mass. 1, 13-14 (1986) (quoting Commonwealth v. Redding, 414 N.E.2d 347, 349, 382 Mass. 154, 157 (1980)).
98 Commonwealth v. Woodward, 694 N.E.2d 1277, 1291, 427 Mass. 659, 678 (1998)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Neal, 464 N.E.2d 1356, 1364, 392 Mass. 1, 12 (1984)).
99 Commonwealth v. Willie, 510 N.E.2d 258, 261, 400 Mass. 427, 432 (1987); see
Commonwealth v. North, 755 N.E.2d 312, 317, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 603, 608-09 (2001).
100Commonwealth v. White, 713 N.E.2d 987, 991, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 430, 433 (1999)
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relief pursuant to the more favorable standard when access to the destroyed
or lost evidence "might have" affected the verdict.' 0'
Massachusetts courts have fashioned or upheld various judicial
remedies for the loss of evidence, from allowing the defendant to bring to
the jury's attention the Commonwealth's negligent handling of the evidence,102 to dismissal of the indictment. 10 3 The problem of negligent handling of evidence is a greater risk with computer data because of its comparative vulnerability. This is because computer-generated evidence is not
"relatively impervious to inadvertent alteration," unlike paper documents.' °4 "[T]he very act of opening an application or file, even if there is
no intention to alter anything, often in fact creates changes although they
may not be immediately visible." 10 5 Having a back-up copy of the information stored on the computer, as discussed supra, reduces the possibility
that evidence will be destroyed or altered irreparably when government
agents perform the search on the computer equipment.1°6 Further, as the
Supreme Judicial Court recognized in Sbordone, computer searches should
be conducted
by qualified persons, which will assist in the preservation of
07
1
evidence.
Again, the Jackson case is instructive. The defendants alleged that
the computer expert's use of a "Wipelnfo" program destroyed the expert's
footsteps in searching the computer, and that such destruction was material
and prejudicial to their defense. Because the Wipelnfo program only
erased a minute fraction of data, and in any case the hard drive of the computer contained no record of which files the expert had examined, the defendants could not establish a reasonable possibility that exculpatory evi(citing Commonwealth v. Sasville, 616 N.E.2d at 483 n.i 1, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 26 n.l 1).
The Massachusetts courts have taken a stricter view of the consequences flowing from the
government's failure to preserve material evidence than the federal courts. id., 47 Mass.
App. Ct. at 434. The United States Supreme Court has decided that no federal due process
violation occurs from lost evidence in the absence of bad faith. Arizona v. Youngblood,
488 U.S. 51 (1988).
101 Sasville, 616 N.E.2d at 483 n. 11,
35 Mass. App. Ct. at 26 n.II (citing Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 589 N.E.2d 1216, 1219, 412 Mass. 401,405 (1992)).
102 See Commonwealth v. Olszewski, 625 N.E.2d 529, 536, 416 Mass. 707, 716-17
(1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 835 (1994).
103 See Commonwealth v. Henderson, 582 N.E.2d 496, 497, 411 Mass. 309, 310
(1991); Sasville, 616 N.E.2d at 484, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 28; see also Commonwealth v.
Harwood, 733 N.E.2d 547, 557, 432 Mass. 290, 302-03 (2000) (judge properly decided not
to dismiss because loss of document not occasioned by bad faith; suppression of witness's
testimony upheld because defendant lost opportunity to impeach).
104 Brennan & Frederiksen, supra note 12, at 65.
105 Id. at n.82 (citing Peter Sommer, Downloads, Logs and Captures: Evidence from
Cyberspace, 5 J. FIN. CRIME 138, 142 (2000)). For example, an agent who has never used
Lotus 1-2-3 could enter the wrong command and unwittingly alter or destroy the data on the
system. Id. at 69.
106Id.
107

at 65.

Commonwealth v. Sbordone, 678 N.E.2d 1184, 1189,424 Mass. 802, 809 (1997).
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dence was destroyed. Furthermore, the computer expert did not actually
open files during his search but instead utilized the view feature to determine the contents of a file. His hard drive, therefore, did not contain a
record of which files he had examined. The defendants thus would not
have been able to reconstruct the path of the expert's search even if they
had been provided with a mirror image of the hard drive before the expert
used the WipeInfo program. As such, the defendants could not establish a
reasonable possibility that a sector-level mirror image of the hard drive, as
it existed prior to the use of the WipeInfo program, would have produced
any evidence favorable to their cause.
PART IV: CONCLUSION
"As society moves into the cyberworld, the novel, distinctive characteristics of electronic information are generating a host of questions as to
how traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is, and should be transposed to this new environment."' 0 8 This article was meant to illustrate the
areas in which traditional legal principles of search and seizure have thus
far been applied to computers and electronically stored information. Further appellate review may be forthcoming.

'08 Brennan & Frederiksen, supra note 12, at 40.

